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Morality makes large-scale societies possible by promoting 
cooperation between individuals, groups, and institutions 
(Curry et al., 2019; Graham et al., 2013; Rai & Fiske, 2011). 
The moral systems that make this possible consist of “inter-
locking sets of values, practices, institutions, and evolved 
psychological mechanisms” (Haidt, 2008, p. 70) that do the 
work of suppressing selfishness and promoting cooperation. 
The interdisciplinary study of morality, including perspec-
tives from biology, psychology, political science, and sociol-
ogy, is partly the study of aspects of these moral systems. It 
studies how values are related to cooperative attitudes and 
behavior (e.g., Van de Vyver et al., 2016), how institutions 
promote or undermine cooperative solutions to societal 
dilemmas (Henrich et al., 2010), and how adaptations in our 
evolutionary past undergird cooperative actions in the here 
and now (Curry et al., 2019). The current approach in moral-
ity science zooms in on single aspects of moral systems with 
the aim of identifying robust empirical regularities and 
causal associations between them (e.g., those mentioned in 
the prior sentence). Here, we aim to take an initial step 
toward mapping out a subsection of the moral system by 
mapping the moral system of foundational moral values.
To map the system of foundational moral values, we first 
need a taxonomy of possible moral values. There are mul-
tiple taxonomies of values, including moral values (Curry 
et al., 2019; Graham et al., 2013; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 
2013; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Schwartz, 1994). Here, we focus 
on moral foundations theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2013), 
because its theoretical foundation takes a systems approach. 
According to MFT, human morality is built from five uni-
versally available but variably developed sets of moral val-
ues: Harm/care, fairness/reciprocity (referred to together as 
the individualizing foundations), ingroup/loyalty, author-
ity/respect, and purity/sanctity (referred to together as the 
binding foundations). MFT claims that the evolved moral 
systems of different groups should be built from the same 
five foundational values, but that they may be structured 
differently. For example, liberals should draw on the indi-
vidualizing foundations of fairness and care when they 
advocate for marginalized groups, while conservatives and 
religious people should draw more evenly across all moral 
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foundations including the binding foundations when they 
preach loyalty to the (religious) ingroup, respect for (reli-
gious) authorities, and purity of mind and body. However, 
insight into these differing moral systems has been limited 
so far, usually focusing on only mean-level differences 
between ideological groups (e.g., Graham et al., 2009), and 
not fully leveraging the possible benefits of a multidimen-
sional model of moral beliefs.
Our research applies newly developed network methods 
to model the moral systems of liberals and conservatives. 
These network methods move beyond latent construct 
approaches (e.g., factor analysis) which view moral values as 
interchangeable indicators of a latent factor, toward a 
dynamic representation of moral systems, where units within 
the system can directly impact each other. This can give us 
new insight into the organization of moral systems, by repre-
senting how specific moral beliefs are related. Using three 
datasets (two from the United States and one from New 
Zealand), we apply network methods to test MFT’s claim 
that liberal moral systems should have a greater difference 
between individualizing and binding foundations, whereas 
conservative moral systems have more similarities between 
binding and individualizing foundations. Furthermore, we 
extend MFT by integrating it with Converse’s (1964) theo-
rizing, to explore how the organization of moral systems 
might differ across different strata of society. Converse 
(1964) argued that elite groups in society show more ideo-
logical constraint in their belief systems (i.e., dependence 
between political beliefs so that, for example, conservative 
ideas “go” together) than occurs within the belief systems of 
nonelite societal groups. Integrating this idea with MFT, we 
test if the moral systems of higher educated liberals/conser-
vatives will be more closely constrained around MFT predic-
tions than less educated liberals/conservatives. Together, this 
research aims to develop our understanding of how (a) moral 
systems are structured, and (b) how this differs according to 
group membership and (c) education level.
Moral Foundation Systems
As a starting point to mapping out moral systems, we focus 
on the system of moral foundations themselves. MFT is 
rooted in the premise that human morality evolved from mul-
tiple innate mental systems (Graham et al., 2013). MFT 
claims that human morality has evolved to suppress selfish-
ness and promote cooperation via foundational values about 
supporting the rights and welfare of individuals (the individ-
ualizing foundations of Fairness and Harm) and encouraging 
groups to work together (the binding foundations of Loyalty, 
Respect, and Purity). These values are widespread within 
and between cultures and are backed by data suggesting they 
have distinct biological and psychological roots (e.g., 
Wagemans et al., 2018 for a review see Graham et al., 2013). 
A pluralistic conception of moral psychology, like that of 
MFT, is widely supported in the literature (e.g., Malka et al., 
2016; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Shweder et al., 1997) and is used as 
the theoretical basis for understanding moral systems (Haidt, 
2008; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010).
In this research, we put the focus on the system of moral 
foundations by conceptualizing moral foundations as net-
works of interconnected moral values (cf. Epskamp & Fried, 
2018). In such a network, the nodes are the indicators of the 
moral values (e.g., responses to items from the moral foun-
dations questionnaire) and the edges (or paths) that connect 
them represent how strongly connected they are in the popu-
lation (i.e., if two values are likely to co-exist at the same 
time). In line with notions of cognitive consistency, nodes 
that are connected in the network aim to be like one another 
(e.g., selecting the “fair” response on two connected nodes) 
and more strongly connected nodes more strongly mutually 
influence each other. Nodes that are not directly connected in 
such a moral foundations network are assumed to not directly 
influence each other (i.e., they are assumed to be condition-
ally independent) and are only connected due to intervening 
nodes and edges in the network. Such network assumptions 
are consistent with a pairwise Markov random field 
(Kindermann & Snell, 1980). Crucially, this complements a 
moral systems approach as it facilitates the measurement of 
the interconnections between moral foundations, how nodes 
influence and change each other, and the structure of the 
moral system (Westaby et al., 2014). By conceptualizing 
moral foundations as a network, we can estimate the system 
of relationships that tie moral foundations together and 
uncover the complexity of a multidimensional moral 
system.
The idea of conceptualizing a psychological construct, 
such as moral foundations, as a system is not new. Others 
have conceptualized psychopathologies (Borsboom, 2017), 
personality traits (Costantini & Perugini, 2016), intelligence 
(van der Maas et al., 2017), stereotypes (Sayans-Jiménez 
et al., 2019), political belief systems (Brandt et al., 2019), 
and individual attitudes (Dalege et al., 2017) as networks. 
For example, in psychopathology, network models of depres-
sion conceptualize depressive symptoms as nodes in a net-
work that mutually influence one another, leading to 
depressive episodes, but also recovery (Cramer et al., 2016). 
In the case of individual attitudes, attitudes are conceptual-
ized as a network of evaluative reactions to an attitude object, 
such as your feelings of hope, feelings of anger, and percep-
tions of competence when you think of Donald Trump 
(Dalege et al., 2016). This presents a more plausible model 
of attitudes, accounting for both cognitive consistency and 
ambivalence between attitudes, as well as attitude strength 
and mere thought effects. Just as network conceptualizations 
and methodologies have moved these domains forward, sim-
ilarly conceptualizing foundational moral values as networks 
can also shed light onto moral systems.
The network approach can be seen as a complement to the 
typical focus of MFT. In the prototypical paper testing MFT, 
the five moral foundations are measured and group 
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differences on these measures are assessed (e.g., Graham 
et al., 2009, 2013; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Weber & 
Federico, 2013), or differences in moral foundations are used 
to predict relevant outcomes (e.g., Koleva et al., 2012; 
Kugler et al., 2014; Malka et al., 2016). Focusing on mean 
differences has identified a number of reliable findings; how-
ever, to understand the behavior of systems, it is necessary to 
focus on the interrelationships between nodes. For example, 
it is possible that groups with similar levels of their moral 
foundations may have different underlying interrelationships 
between the moral foundations. This would suggest that the 
mean similarities mask different underlying logics to the 
moral system. The network approach we adopt makes the 
interrelationships of the underlying moral system the explicit 
focus.
Group Differences in the Structure of 
Moral Systems
Ideological Group Differences
A network approach to moral foundations can provide insight 
into different structures of moral systems between groups. It 
is important to understand if such structural differences exist 
because prior research has demonstrated that this can impact 
important psychological outcomes. For example, the struc-
ture of attitude networks impacted voting behavior (Dalege 
et al., 2017), and the structure of networks of depression 
symptoms also influenced illness progression (van Borkulo 
et al., 2015). Although many potential groups may differ in 
the structure of their moral systems, there are theoretical rea-
sons to expect that ideological groups (e.g., people identify-
ing as liberals and conservatives) have different structures to 
their moral systems. It is already well known, and a defining 
feature of ideological groups, that liberals and conservatives 
differ in terms of the moral values (and related constructs) 
that they endorse, including values of universalism, tradi-
tionalism, humanitarianism, and egalitarianism (Feldman & 
Steenbergen, 2001; Goren et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 
2010). These findings all highlight that ideological groups 
have different moral values, but it does not necessarily imply 
that ideological groups have different moral systems. It is 
possible that the moral system, that is, the relationships 
between the various foundational moral values, is similar 
across ideological groups. For example, Baldassarri and 
Goldberg (2014) found a subgroup consisting of people with 
both liberal and conservative positions on the issues who had 
similarly structured attitudes on economic, moral, civil 
rights, and foreign affairs. That is, this subgroup had a simi-
lar system of attitudes that was operating with a similar logic, 
but attitudes themselves had different mean levels.
There are, however, theoretical reasons to suspect that 
liberals and conservatives differ in terms of their underly-
ing moral systems. When looking at the levels of founda-
tional moral values, MFT predicts that both liberals and 
conservatives will endorse individualizing moral founda-
tions because humans are generally sensitive to fairness 
considerations and are evolved to care for vulnerable others 
(Graham et al., 2009). Conservatives, however, are more 
likely to endorse binding foundations compared with liber-
als (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009) because these foundations 
help address motivations toward traditionalism (Malka 
et al., 2016), cognitive structure and closure, as well as to 
manage perceptions of threat, all things that tend to be 
found in higher levels among conservatives compared with 
liberals (e.g., Jost, 2017). These ideas also point to where 
differences in the structure of the moral system might be 
found. Specifically, this line of reasoning suggests that lib-
erals make sharper distinctions between individualizing 
and binding foundations than do conservatives: whereas 
liberals are thought to only deploy individualizing founda-
tions when making moral judgments, conservatives are 
thought to deploy all five moral foundations. If this is the 
case, liberals’ moral thinking should be relatively compart-
mentalized between individualizing and binding founda-
tions. Conversely, conservatives’ moral thinking should be 
relatively more integrated across individualizing and bind-
ing foundations.
Education Differences
Educational differences may constrain the extent to which 
people organize their moral systems along ideological lines. 
Although ideological differences and ideological reasoning 
characterize some segments of the population, other seg-
ments of the population are less prone to think in ideological 
terms. For example, classic work in political psychology 
(Converse, 1964) conducted around the 1956 presidential 
election finds that only 11.5% of people spontaneously rea-
son about their political beliefs in ideological terms, in part 
because most members of the population are not particularly 
well informed about what it means to be a conservative or a 
liberal. Although this number was over 25% around the time 
of the 1964 election, over the intervening decades the per-
centage of the public reasoning in ideological terms hovers 
around 20% (summarized in Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). It is 
possible that these differences in ideological constraint in an 
individual’s political belief system translate to a lack of con-
straint in moral systems. Research on moral socialization 
(Wainryb & Recchia, 2014) and moral exemplars/role mod-
els (van de Ven et al., 2019) argues that an individual’s moral 
development is at least partly structured by their environ-
ment (e.g., parents, teachers, role models). In line with this, 
MFT claims that although the five moral foundations are the 
first draft of the moral mind, the structure of the moral sys-
tem will be revised through experience (Graham et al., 2009). 
Because a minority of the population reasons about politics 
in ideological terms, only a minority of the population is 
likely to connect foundational moral values in the way pre-
scribed by their ideological beliefs. In other words, although 
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all people may rely on the five basic moral foundations to 
some extent, the moral systems of higher educated liberals or 
conservatives should be more strongly constrained around 
the prototypical liberal (i.e., compartmentalized) or conser-
vative (i.e., integrated) moral structure than in less educated 
people.
There are at least two reasons why education should be a 
key factor moderating the structure of moral systems. First, 
education is associated with multiple political indicators, 
including political engagement (Campbell et al., 1960), 
interest (Easterbrook et al., 2016; Emler & Frazer, 1999), 
and knowledge (Fiske et al., 1990). In this way, education 
gives citizens both the domain-specific skills and resources 
needed to reason about ideological beliefs. Although it 
remains unclear if education is a causal factor motivating 
participation, or a proxy for something else (e.g., socializa-
tion, or network embeddedness; for example, Berinsky & 
Lenz, 2011; Persson, 2015), the relation between education 
and political participation appears to be quite robust. Second, 
education helps socialize people into societal norms, includ-
ing political norms of a country, and is also associated with 
high levels of cognitive abilities (Sniderman et al., 1991). 
Both the norms (and knowledge therein) and the abilities 
allow people with higher levels of education to better con-
nect their ideological beliefs with other relevant attitudes 
(Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). For example, higher educated 
people show a stronger connection between individualism 
and anger about Black people who receive welfare benefits 
than do people who are less educated (Federico, 2006). 
Perhaps as a result of this, people with higher levels of edu-
cation tend to reason about political issues in more ideologi-
cal terms (Federico, 2004). Moreover, there is some early 
evidence that political ideology plays a smaller role moderat-
ing moral judgments of targets in lay people than in academ-
ics (Frimer et al., 2013). Thus, just as the traits and 
experiences associated with higher education may be associ-
ated with more ideological reasoning, education should also 
be associated with more ideological-typical arrangements of 
moral values. Integrating this line of reasoning with MFT, 
we would expect that liberals and conservatives with higher 
education levels should have moral systems which are more 
prototypical of MFT predictions, while less educated groups 
should have less typical MFT responses.
The Current Study
In this study, we test if liberals have more differentiated 
moral systems than conservatives in three large datasets from 
two different countries (the United States and New Zealand). 
We measure the moral system using the moral foundations 
questionnaire as this is designed to tap into people’s endorse-
ment of more abstract moral values which form the basis of 
their moral belief system (Graham et al., 2009; in contrast to 
more concrete moral judgments; Clifford et al., 2015). We 
use techniques from network psychometrics to estimate the 
moral systems of liberals and conservatives in these samples 
with the expectation that liberal systems will have fewer and 
weaker connections between individualizing and binding 
foundations compared with conservatives (H1). We test this 
hypothesis by examining two features of the moral systems. 
First, we use a community detection algorithm that identifies 
nodes (i.e., items) in the network that are part of the same 
cluster (i.e., that are particularly closely associated with each 
other). We then compare our observed network clustering 
with prototypical clustering of moral values as predicted by 
MFT using the Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) (Steinley, 2004). 
We therefore expect that the moral value clusters in conser-
vatives’ moral systems will be more likely to consist of nodes 
from both individualizing and binding foundations, suggest-
ing a close association between individualizing and binding 
foundations. Liberals, however, will be more likely to segre-
gate nodes from individualizing and binding foundations 
into different moral value communities. Second, we will 
examine each network’s assortativity coefficient (Farine, 
2014; Newman, 2003), which assesses the relative strength 
of within-individualizing or within-binding node connec-
tions compared with connections that cross between indi-
vidualizing and binding nodes. We expect liberals to have 
stronger within-connections than between-connections com-
pared with conservatives, reflective of their more compart-
mentalized approach to morality. Going beyond this initial 
test of ideological differences, we test whether ideological 
differences are more pronounced for higher educated people 
than they are for people who are less educated (H2). This 
work therefore extends MFT from examining mean differ-
ences in moral endorsement to also examining the structure 
of the moral systems and how these differ for different ideo-
logical (i.e., liberal and conservative) groups and education 
levels. And so, this work serves as an initial step in mapping 
out the structure of moral systems.
Method
Data Grouping
We aim to estimate networks and compare them between 
ideological and educational groups. Although it would be 
ideal to treat both ideology and education as (quasi)contin-
uous measures, this is not currently possible when compar-
ing networks. As such, participants were grouped as liberal 
or conservative if they either self-reported as one of these 
political ideologies or as either strongly liberal/conserva-
tive, liberal/conservative, or weakly liberal/conservative, 
respectively. Participants who identified as neither, moder-
ate, or another political ideology were not included in our 
sample.
To test the differences between the structure of moral 
foundations in higher and less educated participants, liberals 
and conservative samples were further split according to 
highest level of education participants achieved. Participants 
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were grouped as higher educated if they had acquired a bach-
elor degree or higher, and otherwise were grouped as less 
educated. This aligns with previous research which found 
important differences between individuals who completed a 
college degree and those who did not (e.g., Easterbrook 
et al., 2016; Federico, 2004; Federico & Sidanius, 2002; 
Kuppens et al., 2015).
Sample 1
Sample 1 consisted of 1,081 participants who participated in 
the 2008–2009 American National Election Survey (ANES). 
This particular panel was used to explore new measures that 
are not typically included in the ANES, including moral 
foundations items (measured in July 2008). We had a sample 
of 235 participants who identified as liberal and 372 who 
identified as conservative. Of the 475 participants who iden-
tified as neither, a follow-up question revealed that 121 iden-
tified as closer to liberal (i.e., leaning liberals) and 126 as 
closer to conservatives (i.e., leaning conservatives). Overall, 
few statistical differences occurred between these groups, 
suggesting that it is empirically justifiable to pool the sam-
ples.1 So, to boost the sample size, liberals were pooled with 
leaning liberals and conservatives were pooled with leaning 
conservatives. This resulted in a final sample of 356 liberals 
and 498 conservatives. Splitting into groups of higher and 
less educated participants resulted in a sample of 201 higher 
educated liberals, 155 less educated liberals, 203 higher edu-
cated conservatives, and 295 less educated conservatives.
Sample 2
Sample 2 was gathered in the United States in July 2016 
from a diverse online panel of U.S. residents, originally 
recruited as part of a longitudinal study gathered with U.S. 
National Science Foundation funding in 2008 through vari-
ous online means (e.g., Google Ads) to study judgment and 
decision-making (e.g., with regard to the financial crisis 
beginning in September 2008). Criteria were that a panel 
member be at least 18 years old and fluent in English. The 
total panel comprises about 1,500 members; it is diverse on 
gender, age, education, ethnicity, income, and political orien-
tation, but not intended to be statistically representative of 
the U.S. adult population. However, its results are potentially 
generalizable to U.S. adults with family and job responsibili-
ties; for example, inclusion of questions used by the Gallup 
poll on the 2008 financial crisis yielded similar responses 
from this panel as from the nationally representative Gallup 
samples (Burns et al., 2012). This wave of the sample con-
sisted of 1,046 participants. Of these, 390 participants identi-
fied as liberal and 289 identified as conservative (367 
identified as neither). Each group was then split according to 
education level, resulting in 186 less educated liberals, 204 
higher educated liberals, 134 less educated conservatives, 
and 155 higher educated conservatives.
Sample 3
Sample 3 was gathered from the 2011 wave of the New 
Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS, n.d.). A total 
of 3,990 participants completed the moral foundations items. 
Of this, 1,668 participants identified as a liberal and 904 as 
conservative. Splitting these samples by education level 
resulted in 1,023 higher educated liberals, 593 less educated 
liberals, 351 higher educated conservatives, and 531 less 
educated conservatives. These moral foundations’ data have 
been published previously to answer a different question 
(Malka et al., 2016).
Sample Comparability
The comparability of subsamples was tested (see Supplementary 
Material 1). Overall, the liberal subsamples tended to be 
slightly younger (all samples) and more likely to be female 
(Samples 1 and 3) than the conservative subsamples.
Measures
Moral foundations were measured using Graham et al.’s 
(2011) Moral Foundations Questionnaire scale, anchored at 
“not at all relevant—has nothing to do with my judgments of 
right and wrong,” to “extremely relevant—is one of the most 
important factors when I judge right and wrong.” Sample 1 
(in July 2008) completed 20 items from an early version of 
the scale, consisting of four items per moral foundation, 
measured on a 6-point Likert-type scale. For example, harm 
was measured with the following two items; “Whether or not 
someone cared for someone weak or vulnerable”; “Whether 
or not someone suffered emotionally.” Samples 2 and 3 com-
pleted the full 30-item scale, measuring six items per moral 
foundation. Sample 3 measured this on a 7-point Likert-type 
scale, and Sample 2 measured this on a 6-point scale.
Political ideology. For Sample 1, participants responded to a 
three-choice nominal item (in June 2008, as the most proxi-
mate political ideology measure), asking if they considered 
themselves as liberal, conservative, or neither. In a follow-up 
question, those who responded as neither were asked if they 
think of themselves as “closer to liberals” (i.e., leaning liber-
als), or “closer to conservatives” (i.e., leaning conservatives), 
or neither. In Samples 2 and 3, participants responded to a 
7-point Likert-type scale (1 = extremely liberal, 4 = moder-
ate or middle of the road, 7 = extremely conservative). Those 
who scored 1 to 3 were classified as liberals, those who 
scored 5 to 7 were classified as conservatives. To test for dif-
ferences in ideological strength, this variable was recoded so 
that extremely liberal/conservative = 3, and slightly liberal/
conservative = 1.
Education. In Sample 1, education was measured on a 5-point 
scale (1 = no high school diploma, 2 = high school diploma, 
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3 = some college, no bachelor’s degree, 4 = bachelor’s 
degree, 5 = graduate degree). In Sample 2, education was 
measured on a 7-point scale (1 = Eighth grade or less, 2 = 
high school, no graduate, 3 = high school graduate, 4 = 
vocational, 5 = some college, 6 = college graduate, 7 = 
more than college graduate). In Sample 3, education was 
measured on an 8-point scale, where 1 = Level 1 to 3 Certifi-
cate, 2 = Level 4 Certificate, 3 = Level 5 & 6 Diploma, 4 = 
Level 7 Bachelor Degree, 5 = Level 8 & 9 Postgraduate 
Degree, 6 = Level 10 Doctorate Degree, 7 = Secondary 
School Qualification, 8 = No Qualification.
Analytical Strategy
Network estimation. A total of six networks were constructed 
in each sample. First, (a) a liberal network (n Sample 1 = 
356; n Sample 2 = 289; n Sample 3 = 1,668) and (b) a con-
servative network (n Sample 1 = 498; n Sample 2 = 390; n 
Sample 3 = 904) were estimated. Then, these two networks 
were further split into (c) a higher educated liberal network 
(n Sample 1 = 201; n Sample 2 = 204; n Sample 3 = 1,023), 
(d) a less educated liberal network (n Sample 1 = 155; n 
Sample 2 = 186; n Sample 3 = 593), (e) a higher educated 
conservative network (n Sample 1 = 203; n Sample 2 = 155; 
n Sample 3 = 351), and (f) a less educated conservative net-
work (n Sample 1 = 295; n Sample 2 = 134; n Sample 3 = 
593). All networks were estimated using the bootnet package 
(Epskamp et al., 2018) in R version 3.5.1 (R Core Team, 
2018). We estimated regularized polychoric, partial correla-
tion networks, applying the Extended Bayesian Information 
Criteria graphical LASSO (i.e., least absolute shrinkage; 
Foygel & Drton, 2010; Davison & Hinkey, 1997), following 
Epskamp and Fried’s (2018) recommendations. This means 
that links between nodes (i.e., different moral foundations 
items) can range from −1 to +1, and represent the relation 
between two nodes, conditioning on all other nodes present 
in the network. As such, links can be thought of as the asso-
ciation between nodes after controlling for the relations 
among all other nodes in the network. To simplify the final 
network models, increase replicability, and reduce type I 
error, the regularization LASSO method shrinks small links 
(i.e., which we are uncertain about) to zero, so that they are 
not included in the final network. It utilizes a tuning param-
eter to control how much shrinkage should occur, with lower 
values removing fewer edges and higher values removing 
more. All networks applied a tuning parameter of 0.5, with 
two exceptions—the tuning parameter was relaxed to 0.3 for 
all liberal networks in Sample 1 and conservative networks 
in Sample 2 to avoid the construction of empty networks for 
less educated networks in Sample 1 and both higher and less 
educated networks in Sample 2. This tuning parameter was 
selected because it was the highest parameter that allowed 
nonempty networks to be generated and bootstrapped confi-
dence intervals (CIs) to be calculated. Missing data were 
treated using full information maximum likelihood. Across 
all samples, the data were skewed to the right. Because par-
tial correlation networks are not robust against this nonnor-
mality, we applied a nonparanormal transformation of moral 
foundations items, using the R-package “huge” (Jiang et al., 
2019).
Moral value cluster detection. Our main hypotheses were 
tested using community detection analyses to examine which 
moral foundations items most strongly cluster together. We 
applied the walktrap algorithm for community detection 
because it assigns items to a single cluster, has been shown to 
provide reliable results (Pons & Latapy, 2006), and performs 
well on psychological data (Golino & Epskamp, 2017). We 
ran the walktrap algorithm via an exploratory graph analysis 
(EGA; Golino & Epskamp, 2017), in R-package “EGAnet” 
(version 04; Christensen & Golino, 2019; Golino, 2019). 
Similar to latent variable modeling (e.g., as applied in Gra-
ham et al., 2009), EGA identifies the grouping of items 
within a network; however, it either outperforms or is equal 
to other dimension estimating methods (e.g., parallel analy-
sis, Kaiser-Guttman rule; Golino & Epskamp, 2017). Fur-
thermore, network analysis provides additional information 
about the relations among moral foundations items, consis-
tent with the systems approach we take here.
A summary of EGA network clustering results for each of 
our samples is presented in Table 1. The majority of EGA 
estimates align with the median solution in bootstrapped 
samples, with small corresponding CIs, suggesting satisfac-
tory stability (see Supplementary Material 2 for detailed 
robustness checks).
Cluster segregation. Although the number of clusters differed 
between samples (see Table 1), our core prediction is not 
focused on the number of clusters, but the composition of 
moral values within the clusters and whether individualizing 
and binding foundations mix within them or not. To sum-
marize the composition of clusters within a network, we cal-
culated the mean percentage of segregation across all 
clusters in any given network. Each cluster could range 
from being composed of only items from either the individ-
ualizing foundations (i.e., 100% individualizing/0% bind-
ing) or the binding foundation (i.e., 0% individualizing/100% 
binding), to being maximally mixed (i.e., 50% individual-
izing and 50% binding). We then took the mean of these 
percentages across all clusters in a network. For example, in 
a network with two moral value clusters, where one is 80% 
individualizing/20% binding nodes and the second is 0% 
individualizing/100% binding nodes, the mean moral value 
cluster segregation would be 90%.
ARI. To test if the network clustering of moral values 
observed in our networks differs substantively from the pro-
totypical network structure predicted by MFT, we use the 
CrossClustering Package (Tellaroli et al., 2018) to calculate 
the ARI and associated CIs (Steinley et al., 2016). The ARI is 
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an established measure of whether clustering of nodes in two 
networks differ. As such, we compare the observed network 
clustering of both liberal and conservative2 networks with 
MFT’s liberal prototype (i.e., individualizing foundations 
cluster together separately from binding foundations). Nota-
bly, the ARI is focused on achieving a perfect match between 
the two networks. This means that it would penalize an 
observed network clustering that had perfect segregation of 
individualizing and binding foundations, but split the indi-
vidualizing foundations into two clusters. As such, we coded 
our clustering solution to focus on whether the individualiz-
ing and binding items are segregated or integrated: We coded 
our observed network clustering as 1 for individualizing 
items that were clustered with individualizing items and 2 if 
they clustered with binding items, while binding items that 
were classified with binding items were coded as 2, but as 1 
if they clustered with individualizing items, and 3 if the item 
is in its own cluster (i.e., it is not clustered with anything). 
The ARI equals 1 when network clustering across the two 
networks is the same (with 0.80 ≤ ARI < 0.90 for good 
recovery; 0.65 ≤ ARI < 0.80 for moderate recovery; ARI < 
0.65 for poor recovery; Steinley, 2004), 0 when network 
clustering differs at a level expected by chance, and −1 when 
network clustering differs more than would be expected by 
chance. To compare ARI scores for different networks, we 
calculate a z-test of the difference between ARI scores 
divided by the pooled standard deviation (cf. Steinley et al., 
2016).
Assortativity coefficient. Finally, we calculated the assortativ-
ity coefficient to test the tendency for moral values to be 
more strongly connected within individualizing and binding 
foundations than between them (Newman, 2003). This met-
ric can take a value between −1 and 1, with more positive 
values indicating the presence of a greater strength of rela-
tions within clusters than between them (i.e., the greater the 
tendency for individualizing and binding items to be more 
strongly connected to other individualizing moral values 
than to other binding moral values). We generated the assor-
tativity coefficient using the “assortnet” package (Farine, 
2014) and used the boot package (Canty & Ripley, 2017) to 
calculate 95% CIs around these estimates taken from 1,000 
Table 1. EGA Results, Summarizing Network Cluster Structure for Liberal and Conservative Networks, and Higher and Less Educated 
Networks in Samples 1, 2, and 3.





  Full sample 3 4 0.03 3.93 4.07
  Less educated 2 4 0.04 3.91 4.09
  Higher educated 3 3 0.04 2.92 3.08
 Conservative
  Full sample 3 3 0.02 2.96 3.04
  Less educated 3 3 0.02 2.95 3.05
  Higher educated 4 4 0.05 3.90 4.10
Sample 2
 Liberal
  Full sample 3 3 0.09 2.94 3.05
  Less educated 3 4 0.04 3.92 4.08
  Higher educated 3 3 0.03 2.93 3.07
 Conservative
  Full sample 4 4 0.03 3.94 4.06
  Less educated 6 4 0.08 3.85 4.15
  Higher educated 4 4 0.04 3.92 4.08
Sample 3
 Liberal
  Full sample 3 4 0.03 3.94 4.06
  Less educated 4 4 0.04 3.92 4.07
  Higher educated 3 3 0.03 2.95 3.05
 Conservative
  Full sample 5 4 0.04 3.92 4.08
  Less educated 5 4 0.04 3.93 4.07
  Higher educated 4 4 0.05 3.91 4.09
Note. EGA = exploratory graph analysis; CI = confidence interval.
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nonparametric resampled data, and the CI of the difference 
between liberal/conservative and higher/less educated 
networks.
Results
Comparing Liberal and Conservative Moral 
Systems
We expected that liberal moral systems would be more dif-
ferentiated between individualizing and binding foundations 
compared with conservative moral systems, which would 
have more integration between individualizing and binding 
foundations. We tested this in two ways. First, we compare 
the network clustering to MFT predictions. By assessing 
cluster segregation descriptives, we investigate the type of 
node clustering observed in the networks. If liberal moral 
systems are more differentiated than conservative moral sys-
tems, then moral value clusters in the liberal moral system 
should contain nodes from primarily individualizing or bind-
ing foundations (i.e., have a higher percentage of cluster seg-
regation), whereas the moral value clusters in the conservative 
moral system should contain a mix of nodes from both types 
of foundations (i.e., have a lower percentage of cluster segre-
gation). We move beyond this descriptive analysis and calcu-
lated the ARI (Steinley et al., 2016) to test if the network 
clustering of moral values substantively differ from the pro-
totypical network structure predicted by MFT. We expect 
that liberal network clustering will not differ substantively 
from the MFT’s prototypical liberal clustering, while conser-
vative clustering will differ. Second, we explore the strength 
of connections among moral values. We do so by calculating 
each network’s assortativity coefficient to assess the strength 
of interconnections both within and between individualizing 
and binding foundations in liberal and conservative moral 
systems. We expect that liberal moral systems would have 
stronger connections within individualizing and binding 
foundations compared with between foundation types, 
whereas conservative moral systems would have more simi-
larly strong connections within and between foundation 
types.
Test 1: Moral Value Cluster Segregation
Both liberal and conservative networks consistently show 
clear clustering along the divisions predicted by MFT (see 
Figure 1 for Sample 1 networks; for all network visualiza-
tions see Supplementary Material 3). The key question is 
whether the moral value communities typically contain pri-
marily individualizing or binding nodes, or if the two types 
of nodes are mixed across communities. For the liberal net-
works, the network clusters in Sample 3 are consistent with 
the pattern predicted by MFT (see Figure 2). Harm and fair-
ness items were always clustered together, separately from 
authority, loyalty, and purity items. In Samples 1 and 2, clus-
tering in the liberal network was not perfectly segregated. In 
general, they did show segregation of individualizing and 
binding items; however, two of 20 (Sample 1) and three of 30 
items (Sample 2) were not classified in line with MFT pre-
dictions. In Sample 1, one purity (p5) and loyalty item (l5) 
was grouped with the individualizing foundation (i.e., one 
mixed cluster from a total of three clusters). In Sample 2, one 
Figure 1. Network visualization with nodes colored according to community membership for liberal (left panel, a) and conservative 
(right panel, b) networks, Sample 1.
Note. Items labeled with “h” are harm item, “f” are fairness items, “l” are loyalty items, “a” are authority items, and “p” are purity items. Thicker links 
between nodes represent stronger connections, with positive links shown as undashed and negative links are dashed.
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harm (h6) and fairness (f6) item was grouped with binding 
foundations and one authority item (a3) was grouped with 
individualizing foundations (two mixed clusters from a total 
of three clusters).
Importantly, conservative moral systems showed less seg-
regation compared with the liberal moral systems, with more 
mixing of harm, fairness, authority, loyalty, and purity items 
within clusters (see Figure 2). In Sample 1, the algorithm 
identified three clusters, two of which included a mix of indi-
vidualizing and binding items. Four clusters were identified 
in Sample 2, three of which were mixed. Of the five clusters 
identified in Sample 3, two were mixed.
The differences in cluster segregation were also evident in 
the ARI analyses (see Figure 3). The liberal samples had 
moderate to perfect recovery of MFT’s prototypical network 
clustering (Sample 1: ARI = 0.62, 95% CI = [0.48, 0.76]; 
Sample 2: ARI = 0.63, 95% CI = [0.53, 0.72]; Sample 3: 
ARI = 1.00, 95% CI = [0.91, 1.09]). Moreover, in each sam-
ple, the ARIs were significantly higher in the liberal net-
works than the conservative networks (with nonoverlapping 
CIs), which showed very poor to moderate recovery of 
MFT’s prototypical network clustering (Sample 1: ARI = 
0.12, 95% CI = [−0.02, 0.26], z = 7.00, p < .001; Sample 2: 
ARI = 0.13, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.22], z = 10.29, p < .001; 
Sample 3: ARI = 0.63, 95% CI = [0.53, 0.72]; z = 7.71, 
p < .001). Together, community analyses demonstrate that 
clustering in liberal networks was more similar to the MFT 
liberal prototype than was the clustering in the conservative 
networks: There was more mixing of individualizing and 
binding items in the conservative compared with the liberal 
moral system, suggesting that these constructs may be rela-
tively integrated in the conservative moral system.
Test 2: Assortativity Coefficient
The same hypothesis was tested with the assortativity coef-
ficient. Consistent with the expectation that items were sub-
stantively more likely to be connected within individualizing 
and binding foundations than between them for liberals than 
for conservatives, liberals’ assortativity was always higher 
than the conservative assortativity (see Figure 4). 
Furthermore, we bootstrapped the differences between assor-
tativity scores and found that the liberal network was more 
interconnected within foundations than between them in 
comparison with the conservative network with CIs not 
overlapping with 0, across Sample 1 (difference = 0.32, 95% 
CI difference = [0.17, 0.47]), Sample 2 (difference = 0.22, 
95% CI difference = [0.02, 0.36]), and Sample 3 (difference 
= 0.29, 95% CI difference = [0.21, 0.35]). These findings 
are supported by Table 2 (Panels 1a–1c), which shows that 
the average connection strength tends to be lower between 
individualizing and binding foundations in liberal networks 
than conservative networks. For example, in the liberal 
Figure 2. Average percent of moral value cluster segregation for 
liberal and conservative networks, within Samples 1, 2, and 3.
Note. Where 100 means all moral value clusters within a network contain 
only individualizing or binding foundations (i.e., complete segregation), 
and 50 means that all moral value clusters contain a mix of 50/50 
individualizing and binding foundations (i.e., complete integration).
Figure 3. Adjusted Rand Index and 95% confidence intervals 
showing tendencies for individualizing and binding moral values to 
cluster separately for liberals and conservatives in Samples 1, 2, 
and 3, where an ARI of 0 (marked with a dashed line) shows that 
the cluster solution did not differ from chance, and an ARI of 1 
shows a prototypical liberal moral system (with individualizing and 
binding foundations completely segregated).
Note. ARI = Adjusted Rand Index.
Figure 4. Assortativity coefficient and 95% confidence 
intervals showing tendencies for moral values to be more 
strongly connected within individualizing and binding 
foundations than between them for liberal and conservative 
moral systems for Samples 1, 2, and 3, where an assortativity 
coefficient of 0 (marked with a dashed line) shows equal 
tendencies for individualizing and binding foundations to be 
connected to one another.
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Table 2. Network Connections Summary, Presenting the 
Average Strength of Connections Within and Between Moral 
Foundations Items for (1) Liberals and (2) Conservatives.
(1a) Sample 1, Liberals
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.02
2 Fairness 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.02
3 Loyalty 0.08 0.06 0.03
4 Authority 0.11 0.05
5 Purity 0.15
(1b) Sample 2, Liberals
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02
2 Fairness 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01
3 Loyalty 0.06 0.04 0.03
4 Authority 0.06 0.04
5 Purity 0.10
(1c) Sample 3, Liberals
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01
2 Fairness 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00
3 Loyalty 0.08 0.04 0.01
4 Authority 0.08 0.03
5 Purity 0.12
(2d) Sample 1, Conservatives
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03
2 Fairness 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.03
3 Loyalty 0.05 0.04 0.02
4 Authority 0.09 0.06
5 Purity 0.13
(2e) Sample 2, Conservatives
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02
2 Fairness 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02
3 Loyalty 0.07 0.04 0.01
4 Authority 0.05 0.03
5 Purity 0.10
(2f) Sample 3, Conservatives
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.02
2 Fairness 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01
3 Loyalty 0.07 0.03 0.01
4 Authority 0.07 0.03
5 Purity 0.12
Note. Highlighted diagonals show average connection strength within 
harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity items, respectively (e.g., 
Cell 1,1 shows average connection strength among harm items). 
Unhighlighted off-diagonals show average connection strength between 
moral foundations items (e.g., Cell 1,2 shows average connection strength 
from harm to fairness items). (1) Liberal networks are presented on the 
left, with, Sample 1 (see Panel 1a), Sample 2 (1b), and Sample 3 (1c); (2) 
conservative networks are presented on the right, with, Sample 1 (2d), 
Sample 2 (2e), and Sample 3 (2f).
(continued)
Table 2. (continued)
network in Sample 1 (Panel 1a), the average connection 
strength between harm and fairness items is larger than the 
average connection strength between harm or fairness and 
any of the binding foundations. However, in the conservative 
network in Sample 1 (Panel 2d), the average connection 
strength from harm/fairness to loyalty is higher than the 
average connection between harm and fairness. Thus, across 
all three samples networks show clear support for MFT pre-
dictions that liberal and conservative moral systems are dif-
ferently structured, with liberals distinguishing more strongly 
harm and fairness from loyalty, authority, and purity, while 
conservatives have stronger connections among the five 
foundations.
Liberal and Conservative Belief Systems 
According to Education Level
Next, we compared liberal and conservative networks 
according to education level using the same (a) cluster segre-
gation and ARI, and (b) assortativity tests as we used above. 
This tests our prediction that the moral systems of higher 
educated individuals will be structured more strongly in line 
with MFT than for less educated individuals. This means that 
we expect higher educated liberal moral value networks to 
have higher percentage segregation, ARI, and assortativity 
than the less educated liberal networks. This pattern should 
be reversed for conservative networks. The networks for 
Sample 1 are in Figure 5 (see Supplemental Materials for all 
networks).
Liberal networks. First, consistent with expectations, the lib-
eral education networks for Samples 1 and 2 showed a higher 
percent cluster segregation in moral value clusters for the 
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Figure 5. Network visualization with nodes colored according to community membership for less educated (1a) and higher educated 
(1b) liberal networks, and less educated (2c) and higher educated (2d) conservatives, Sample 1.
Note. Items labeled with “h” are harm item, “f” are fairness items, “l” are loyalty items, “a” are authority items, and “p” are purity items. Thicker links 
between nodes represent stronger connections, with positive links shown as undashed and negative links are dashed.
higher educated networks than the less educated networks 
(see Figure 6). In Sample 3, both the higher educated and less 
educated networks had similar levels of segregation (although 
the higher educated network had fewer clusters). Consistent 
with this, the ARI (see Figure 7) showed that higher educated 
liberals were significantly closer to the prototypic MFT lib-
eral structure than less educated liberals for Sample 1 (z = 
10.29, p < .01) and Sample 2 (z = 2.74, p < .01). However, 
no difference was found for Sample 3 (z = 0.00, p = 1.00); 
both education levels segregated individualizing and binding 
foundations as predicted by MFT. Second, for Samples 2 and 
3, the higher educated networks had higher assortativity 
coefficients—indicating stronger connections within indi-
vidualizing and binding foundations than between them—
than did the less educated networks (see Figure 83). However, 
the bootstrapped difference between networks only reached 
significance for Sample 3 (difference = 0.12, 95% CI differ-
ence = [0.03, 0.19]), not for Sample 1 (difference = 0.01, 
Figure 6. Average percent of moral value cluster segregation 
for higher educated and less educated liberal and conservative 
networks, within Samples 1, 2 and 3.
Note. Here, 100 means all moral value clusters within a network 
contain only individualizing or binding foundations (i.e., complete 
segregation), and 50 means that all moral value clusters contain a 
mix of 50/50 individualizing and binding foundations (i.e., complete 
integration).
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Table 3. Network Connections Summary, Presenting the 
Average Strength of Connections Within and Between Moral 
Foundations Items for Higher and Less Educated Liberals.
(1a)
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.01
2 Fairness 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.04
3 Loyalty 0.05 0.06 0.02




 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02
2 Fairness 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01
3 Loyalty 0.06 0.04 0.02




 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
2 Fairness 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00
3 Loyalty 0.08 0.03 0.02




 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02
2 Fairness 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.01
3 Loyalty 0.06 0.05 0.03




 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01
2 Fairness 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
3 Loyalty 0.05 0.04 0.03
4 Authority 0.06 0.03
5 Purity 0.09
Figure 7. Adjusted Rand Index and 95% confidence intervals 
showing tendencies for individualizing and binding moral values 
to cluster separately for higher educated and less educated 
liberals and conservatives in Samples 1, 2 and 3, where an 
ARI of 0 (marked with a dashed line) shows that the cluster 
solution did not differ from chance, and an ARI of 1 shows 
a prototypical liberal moral system (with individualizing and 
binding foundations completely segregated).
Note. ARI = Adjusted Rand Index.
Figure 8. Assortativity coefficient and 95% confidence intervals 
showing tendencies for segregation of individualizing and binding 
foundations within higher educated and less educated liberal and 
conservative moral systems for Samples 1, 2 and 3, where an 
assortativity coefficient of 0 (marked with a dashed line) shows 
equal tendencies for individualizing and binding foundations to be 
connected to one another.
95% CI difference = [−0.20, 0.22]) or Sample 2 (difference 
= 0.07, 95% CI difference = [−0.06, 0.21]). This is also 
illustrated by Table 3, which shows that differences between 
the average connection strengths are not large, but where 
they occur the strength of connections between harm or fair-
ness and the three binding foundations in the higher educated 
networks (Panels 2d–2f) was usually the same or higher in 
the less educated networks (Panels 1a–1c). In sum, we found 
only weak support for our second hypothesis: Although 
results generally align with our expectation that higher edu-
cated belief systems will be more tightly, ideologically con-
strained (i.e., a closer match to MFT’s prototypical liberal 
belief system) than less educated belief systems, the (continued)
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(2f)
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00
2 Fairness 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00
3 Loyalty 0.07 0.03 0.01
4 Authority 0.07 0.03
5 Purity 0.12
Note. Highlighted diagonals show average connection strength within 
harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity items, respectively (e.g., Cell 
1,1 shows average connection strength among harm items). Unhighlighted 
off-diagonals show average connection strength between moral 
foundations items (e.g., Cell 1,2 shows average connection strength from 
harm to fairness items). Less educated liberal networks are presented on 
the left, labeled as (1) with, Sample 1 (see Panel 1a), Sample 2 (1b), and 
Sample 3 (1c); higher educated liberal networks are presented on the 
right, labeled as (2) with, Sample 1 (2d), Sample 2 (2e), and Sample 3 (2f).
(continued)
Table 3. (continued)
differences between moral systems were not consistently nor 
as large as expected.
Conservative networks. Next, we compared higher educated 
and less educated conservative networks. Results were 
inconsistent across studies. First, only in Sample 2 does the 
segregation in moral value clusters follow expectations of 
MFT (i.e., higher educated showing less segregation; see 
Figure 6). In Samples 1 and 3, higher educated networks 
showed more segregation of individualizing and binding 
items within clusters than the less educated networks. This 
is opposite of expectations. This was reflected in the ARI 
(see Figure 7), where unexpectedly, the less educated con-
servative networks had a significantly lower ARI than 
higher educated conservative networks in Sample 1 (z = 
7.00, p < .001) and Sample 3 (z = 2.38, p < .01). The ARI 
in networks in Sample 2 was highly similar, with overlap-
ping confidence intervals (z = 0.39, p > .34). Second, the 
intervals around the assortativity scores of higher and less 
educated networks also clearly overlapped with each other 
(see Figure 8). As such, no significant differences emerged 
between these groups (Sample 1: difference = 0.04, 95% 
CI difference = [−0.17, 0.26]; Sample 2: difference = 0.06, 
95% CI difference = [−0.34, 0.19]; Sample 3: difference = 
0.07, 95% CI difference = [−0.05, 0.31]). When zooming 
in to look at the average strength of connections between 
domains, Panels (1a)–(2f) in Table 4 show that there is no 
consistent pattern of individualizing and binding items 
being more strongly connected on average in one specific 
higher educated or less educated network. For example, in 
Sample 1, harm items are more strongly connected to loy-
alty items in the higher educated network (Panel 2d), but 
fairness is more strongly connected to loyalty items in the 
less educated network (Panel 1a). Thus, we found no clear 
Table 4. Network Connections Summary, Presenting the 
Average Strength of Connections Within and Between Moral 
Foundations Items for Higher and Less Educated Conservatives.
(1a)
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.03
2 Fairness 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.04
3 Loyalty 0.05 0.04 0.03




 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.02
2 Fairness 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02
3 Loyalty 0.05 0.03 0.00




 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
2 Fairness 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01
3 Loyalty 0.06 0.03 0.01




 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.02
2 Fairness 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.02
3 Loyalty 0.04 0.03 0.02




 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03
2 Fairness 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02
3 Loyalty 0.06 0.04 0.02
4 Authority 0.05 0.04
5 Purity 0.07
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(2f)
Average connection strength
 1 2 3 4 5
1 Harm 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
2 Fairness 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01
3 Loyalty 0.07 0.02 0.01
4 Authority 0.06 0.02
5 Purity 0.12
Note. Highlighted diagonals show average connection strength within 
harm, fairness, loyalty, authority, and purity items, respectively (e.g., 
Cell 1,1 shows average connection strength among harm items). 
Unhighlighted off-diagonals show average connection strength between 
moral foundations items (e.g., Cell 1,2 shows average connection strength 
from harm to fairness items). Less educated conservative networks are 
presented on the left, labeled as (1) with, Sample 1 (see Panel 1a), Sample 
2 (1b), and Sample 3 (1c); higher educated conservative networks are 
presented on the right, labeled as (2) with, Sample 1 (2d), Sample 2 (2e), 
and Sample 3 (2f).
Table 4. (continued)
support for our hypothesis that the higher educated conser-
vative networks would be a better match to MFT predic-
tions than the less educated networks.
Discussion
This research applied network methods to offer new insight 
into the organization of moral belief systems and group-
based differences in these systems between (a) liberals and 
conservatives, and between (b) higher and less educated 
people. First, across three large datasets (from the United 
States and New Zealand), we provided support for MFT 
predictions about differences in liberal and conservative 
moral belief systems (H1). Using community detection 
(and an analysis of ARI), we found that liberal moral belief 
systems exhibited more segregation between individualiz-
ing and binding foundations in moral value clusters, in 
contrast to conservative moral belief systems which 
showed more integration between these foundations within 
clusters. The assortativity coefficient showed that the aver-
age connection strength of individualizing and binding 
items was lower within liberal networks than in conserva-
tive networks. Second, we found only weak support for our 
prediction that ideological differences between liberals 
and conservatives are more pronounced for people who are 
higher educated than for people who are less educated 
(H2). Among liberals, we found that higher educated net-
works were generally more aligned with MFT predictions, 
but these differences were usually relatively small: 
Although the (a) ARI analysis demonstrated that individu-
alizing and binding items were significantly more segre-
gated in moral value clusters in higher educated networks 
in comparison with less educated networks (with the 
exception of Sample 3), the (b) assortativity coefficient 
showed that the average strength of connections within 
individualizing and binding foundations were not stronger 
than between them (with the exception of Sample 3). 
Among conservatives, we found no clear support for this 
prediction: Differences between higher and less educated 
conservatives were inconsistent. In short, we found that 
liberals had more segregated moral belief systems than did 
conservatives and that this difference was inconsistently 
moderated by education.
Theoretical Implications
This research gives insight into the interlocking moral sys-
tem referenced by Haidt (2008; and others, for example, 
Converse, 1964). Our results present what we believe is 
the first test of the organization of moral systems predicted 
by MFT. Our findings join with prior approaches to model-
ing political belief systems (Brandt et al., 2019) and indi-
vidual attitudes (Dalege et al., 2016) to show the value of 
modeling moral belief systems as networks. In doing so, 
we have provided additional detail about the ways that spe-
cific moral values relate to each other. Building on earlier 
work, our findings suggest substantive differences not only 
in liberals’ and conservatives’ average endorsement of 
moral foundations items (Graham et al., 2009), but in the 
structure of their moral belief systems as well. Although 
our results show that the organization of moral systems 
observed were not always a perfect match to MFT expecta-
tions (e.g., there was a small percentage of mixing of indi-
vidualizing and binding foundations within clusters in 
liberal networks in Samples 1 and 2), MFT did present a 
close characterization of moral belief systems and differ-
ences between liberal and conservative networks, espe-
cially in U.S. samples. Indeed, moral value clustering and 
connectedness among individualizing and binding founda-
tions differs among liberals and conservatives, was largely 
consistent with MFT expectations. Moreover, supplemen-
tary analyses (see Supplementary Material 4) show that the 
increased segregation of individualizing and binding moral 
systems seem to be specific to liberals, in that the sample 
of participants who identified as neither liberal nor conser-
vative also showed higher levels of connectedness between 
different moral foundations, at comparable levels as con-
servatives. Together, these results not only provide the first 
systems support for MFT that we are aware of but also has 
implications for how moral thinking might develop differ-
ently in groups with different political ideologies.
Theoretically, items that are more closely interrelated 
within networks, such as the harm and fairness items for 
liberals, should be more likely to assume the same state as 
each other (e.g., Dalege et al., 2016; Watts & Strogatz, 
1998). In this way, judgments within clusters may be more 
likely to be aligned as morally relevant or not. For example, 
if a liberal believes that a policy is unfair to a person or 
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group, they should also be more likely to see the policy as 
harmful (and vice versa). In this way, our research suggests 
that harm and fairness beliefs not only form two key pillars 
in liberal morality but may also be more strongly associated 
than was appreciated previously (e.g., by previous unique 
factors emerging in factor analyses; Graham et al., 2009). 
One interesting possible implication of this is that in liber-
als, for whom individualizing and binding items cluster 
separately, activation of the harm/fairness cluster may be 
less likely to activate (or to even inhibit) loyalty, authority, 
or purity concerns. In contrast, results show that for conser-
vatives, fairness items are more likely to cluster with loy-
alty items, so fairness might be more likely to imply loyalty. 
It is interesting to note that even within liberal networks, 
connections among binding items are relatively strong. 
This suggests that if a person judges an act or event as 
impure, they are also be likely to see it as disloyal to their 
country or lacking respect for authority, even for liberals. 
From this perspective, these binding moral foundations are 
not irrelevant for liberals (cf. Frimer et al., 2014), but can 
be called upon relatively independently of harm/fairness 
concerns.
Our results also provide only weak support for Converse’s 
(1964) claim that constraint in moral systems may differ for 
those with different levels of education. First, although we 
found notable differences between moral belief systems of 
higher educated and less educated conservatives, these dif-
ferences did not seem to be systematic, or follow theoretical 
expectations. Second, while results for higher educated liber-
als were more in line with MFT’s prototypical liberal struc-
ture, differences with less educated liberals often did not 
reach significance (with the exception of ARI clustering, for 
Samples 1 and 2, and associativity for Sample 3). This sug-
gests that although higher and less educated moral systems 
do seem to differ somewhat from one another, these differ-
ences are not strongly consistent with the idea that higher 
educated groups would have more prototypical moral sys-
tems. Although this does not contradict Converse’s (1964) 
claim that ideological constraint may be weaker in less edu-
cated than higher educated populations, it may provide some 
evidence that constraint among political belief systems dif-
fers from constraint among moral belief systems. While 
political belief systems may be structured by political elites 
(i.e., from the top down), morality may have a more funda-
mental basis which is less susceptible to elite cues.
Altogether, this research highlights the value of a net-
work approach to modeling moral foundations. A network 
approach highlights local interdependence between moral 
beliefs. This means we can investigate how moral beliefs 
mutually influence and/or impose constraint on each other 
through these connections and the consequences of this. 
For example, our cluster analysis shows that harm and fair-
ness are more strongly dependent on each other within lib-
eral moral systems. This may have implications for the 
co-activation of harm and fairness values which could be 
addressed in future research. We believe that this method 
crucially fits theoretically with the moral systems approach 
espoused by MFT, allowing the conceptualization and 
empirical testing of the interlocking moral beliefs that form 
MFT’s moral systems.
Limitations
The present analyses offer a cross-sectional analysis of moral 
systems in different societal groups. This means that net-
works are modeling (partial) correlations, presenting bidirec-
tional relations between items, but cannot be used to infer 
causation. As such, we cannot speak to whether endorsing 
specific moral foundation items will be most likely to stimu-
late an individual to think of themselves as a liberal/conser-
vative. Instead, results present a description of group 
differences. Network models can therefore be thought of as 
shared moral belief systems existing within different liberal/
conservative and higher/less educated groups. It is important 
to note that these are not the belief systems of individuals. 
Further research is required to explore implications of such 
belief system structures for individuals.
Second, item stability analyses (see Supplementary 
Material 2) suggested that especially for conservative net-
works, stability was often lower than for liberals. This means 
that the exact communities detected within the EGA may be 
less likely to replicate in future research. Although our analy-
sis suggested that plausible alternative models showed simi-
lar levels of mixing of individualizing and binding items 
within clusters (the focus of our analysis), instability does 
mean that the exact clustering solutions should be taken with 
a grain of salt. Especially in the subgroup (i.e., education) 
analyses, one reason for instability may be the smaller sam-
ple sizes, which are not very large for conducting network 
analyses. However, this does not explain why liberal net-
works with similar sample sizes seemed to be more stable. 
From a statistical perspective, this suggests that the moral 
foundations questionnaire scale might be in need of further 
refinement for measurement in conservative populations (see 
Frimer et al., 2013 and Voelkel & Brandt, 2019 for a discus-
sion of further limitations of the MFT scale associated with 
ambiguity and unrepresentativeness of items). However, 
from a theoretical perspective, this result might be consid-
ered to be relatively consistent with MFT, suggesting that for 
conservative networks there are multiple ways that individu-
alizing and binding items may connect and be associated 
with one another. That is, the same results that suggest theo-
retical support for MFT may also suggest a shortcoming of 
the moral foundations questionnaire for assessing moral 
foundations for conservatives.
Conclusion
This research joins with prior research modeling political 
belief systems (Brandt et al., 2019) and individual attitudes 
16 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 00(0)
(Dalege et al., 2016) to show the value of modeling moral 
belief systems as networks. In doing so, we have presented 
new support for MFT’s claim that individualizing and bind-
ing foundations are differently endorsed by liberals and con-
servatives. Our results add to this by showing that the 
connections between individualizing and binding founda-
tions also differ for liberals and conservatives (but not 
strongly according to level of education). Importantly, the 
network method employed in this research allows renewed 
support for the bolder claim that the moral systems of liber-
als and conservatives differ.
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Notes
1. To test if leaning liberals and conservatives could be pooled 
with the liberal and conservative identifiers, respectively, we 
compared their mean-level responses with the moral founda-
tion items, and the strength of the relations between moral 
foundations. First, we compared liberals and liberal lean-
ers. Independent samples t-tests showed that few differences 
occurred between liberals and leaning liberals, all ts < 1.67, 
all ps > .09; with one marginally different result: th4(217) = 
1.91, p = .057, 95% CI = [−0.59, 0.01]. However, Fisher’s 
Z tests comparing correlations in independent samples showed 
that leaners did evidence significantly more positive relations 
between the (liberal) moral foundations of harm and (more con-
servative) moral foundations of loyalty, authority, and purity 
(Zs = 2.005–3.47, ps < .05). No further differences were 
found. Second, we compared conservatives and leaning con-
servatives. Independent samples t-tests showed that generally 
no differences occurred between conservatives and conserva-
tive leaners, all ts < 1.44, all ps > .14; with two exceptions: 
th5(233.83) = 2.14, p < .04, 95% CI = [0.02, 0.51]; th4(233.83) 
= 1.92, p < .06, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.45]. Fisher’s Z tests com-
paring correlations in independent samples showed that the 
leaners did evidence significantly stronger positive relations 
between the purity items and remaining moral foundation items 
than conservatives (Zs = 2.11–3.04, ps < .04).
2. This is because no specific clustering pattern for conservatives 
is predicted beyond the expectation that individualizing and 
binding foundations will cluster together.
3. Confidence intervals are asymmetric because they are derived 
from statistics that pull from a nonnormal distribution.
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